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Abstract
Gathering and extracting security requirements adequately requires extensive effort, experience,
and time, as large amounts of data need to be analyzed. While many manual and academic
approaches have been developed to tackle the discipline of Security Requirements Engineering
(SRE), a need still exists for automating the SRE process. This need stems mainly from the
difficult, error-prone, and time-consuming nature of traditional and manual frameworks.
Machine learning techniques have been widely used to facilitate and automate the extraction of
useful information from software requirements documents and artifacts. Such approaches can be
utilized to yield beneficial results in automating the process of extracting and eliciting security
requirements. However, the extraction of security requirements alone leaves software engineers
with yet another tedious task of prioritizing the most critical security requirements. The
competitive and fast-paced nature of software development, in addition to resource constraints
make the process of security requirements prioritization crucial for software engineers to make
educated decisions in risk-analysis and trade-off analysis.
To that end, this thesis presents an automated framework/pipeline for extracting and prioritizing
security requirements. The proposed framework, called the Security Requirements Extraction
and Prioritization Framework (SecREP) consists of two parts:
x

SecREP Part 1: Proposes a machine learning approach for identifying/extracting security
requirements from natural language software requirements artifacts (e.g., the Software
Requirement Specification document, known as the SRS documents)

x

SecREP Part 2: Proposes a scheme for prioritizing the security requirements identified in
the previous step.
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For the first part of the SecREP framework, three machine learning models (SVM, Naive Bayes,
and Random Forest) were trained using an enhanced dataset the “SecREP Dataset” that was
created as a result of this work. Each model was validated using resampling (80% of for training
and 20% for validation) and 5-folds cross validation techniques. For the second part of the
SecREP framework, a prioritization scheme was established with the aid of NLP techniques. The
proposed prioritization scheme analyzes each security requirement using Part-of-speech (POS)
and Named Entity Recognition methods to extract assets, security attributes, and threats from the
security requirement. Additionally, using a text similarity method, each security requirement is
compared to a super-sentence that was defined based on the STRIDE threat model. This
prioritization scheme was applied to the extracted list of security requirements obtained from the
case study in part one, and the priority score for each requirement was calculated and showcased.
Keywords-machine learning, natural language processing, text classification, software
security, security requirements engineering, security requirement prioritization.
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction
Security in the context of software systems is an ever-growing concern especially with
the degree of ubiquity and availability the world is witnessing in software driven services,
networking, and shared resources. With that in consideration, security presents itself as an
integral part in implementing a successful and satisfactory software that incorporates the
necessary measures for protecting the stakeholders’ assets [37].
Security concerns must be addressed and accounted for in the early stages of the software
development lifecycle (SDLC) to prevent security risks, exploits, and financial loss
[2,13,28,33,36,38,51,55]. The high costs incurred by organizations due to poor security
requirement engineering (SRE) show that there would be a high value to even a small
improvement in this area. By the time that an application is deployed in its operational
environment, it is very difficult and expensive to significantly improve its security [36]. Bearing
in mind these elements, security requirements engineering and elicitation, was granted a specific
area of knowledge in the information technology literature.
Security Requirements Engineering (SRE) is an activity conducted during the early stage
of the software development process. SRE involves eliciting, analyzing, and documenting
security requirements. However, SRE is still a new area of knowledge that requires considerable
efforts and expertise for identifying complex security requirements. Additionally, for most
software systems used and sold on commercial levels, the system requirements specification
(SRS) document is normally of a large size and intertwined nature. This could result in
neglecting or incorrectly identifying valuable security requirements [1,46].
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The elicitation and identification of security requirements alone, leaves software
engineers with yet another tedious task of prioritizing the most critical security requirements.
Even though one might think that all security requirements are considered relevant,
implementing all security mechanisms that protect the software against every possible threat is
not feasible and almost impossible. The competitive and fast-paced nature of software
development, in addition to resource constraints makes the process of security requirements
prioritization crucial for software engineers to make educated decisions in risk-analysis and
trade-off analysis and guarantees that at least the topmost security measures are accounted for
and implemented, especially in the software’s early releases [8,15,17,38,41,57,58].
Machine learning techniques have been widely used to facilitate and automate strenuous
and complex tasks [53]. Machine learning refers to the area of knowledge that falls under the
realm of artificial intelligence (AI). Where an algorithm is fed a series of data to either transform,
restructure, extract information, find similarities, or predictions from that said data, using
predefined sets of rules and/or mathematical equations. This can be used in a variety of
applications such as, image recognition, weather prediction, fraud detection, information
extraction, etc. Under the concept of machine learning falls yet another sub area of knowledge,
that is Natural language processing (NLP). NLP offer in depth techniques and focus on
processing natural language raw text artifacts into desired useful information.
The opportunity that presents itself here is to introduce a machine learning process to
automatically identify the security requirements from a software system’s requirements
specifications artifact (these artifacts generally tend to be 100s of pages in length, depending on
the size of the software being developed). Additionally, a prioritization process can be added that
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provides a reliable scheme for the identified security requirements in a single automated pipeline.
Such pipeline would offer great value, save time, and labor, and potentially improve the
efficiency and the accuracy of an otherwise manual process.
1.1 Goal
The overarching goal of this work is to establish a refined process where security is
adequately incorporated in the early stages of the SDLC, namely the requirements elicitation and
specification stage. This will ensure that the security risks to the software and any future
correction measures can be significantly minimized.
Thus, the overall goal of this thesis is stated as follows:
“To automate the identification/extraction and prioritization of security requirements
from natural language software requirements artifacts”
1.2 Related Work
The literature as it stands offers abundant work in security requirements engineering, as
well as prioritization. Additionally, many scholars tackled the uses of machine learning
approaches to address the extraction, elicitation, and prioritization of software requirements.
However, most of the previous work is mostly focused on the general concept of automating the
extraction of software requirements, without addressing in depth the specificity of security
requirements extraction and prioritization. This section summarizes relevant work addressing
either the identification of security requirements using machine learning approaches, or the issue
of prioritizing security requirements.
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1.2.1 Machine learning for security requirements classification
In the context of utilizing machine learning techniques for extracting security
requirements form natural language artifacts Riaz et al. [46] introduced a framework that takes as
input natural language artifacts documents. The process then examines each sentence in the
document to determine whether it is a security relevant sentence and then classify it according to
the security objectives, that are either explicitly stated or implied by that sentence. The authors
used and compared the results of a ݇-NN classifier, and from Weka[20], a multinomial naïve
Bayes classifier, and a SMO (sequential minimal optimization classifier). As for the training data
the authors selected six different documents form the health care domain, and with the aid of
three experts classified 10,963 sentences and extracted corresponding security objectives. The
manual analysis showed that 46% of the sentences were security relevant. Of these, 28%
explicitly mention security while 72% of the sentences are functional requirements with security
implications. The proposed tool predicted and classified 82% of the security objectives for all the
sentences (precision) and identified 79% of all security objectives implied by the sentences
within the documents (recall). Finally based on an analysis they conducted; the authors develop
context-specific templates that can be instantiated into a set of functional security requirements
by filling in key information from security relevant sentences.
Kobilica et al.[29] work was more focused on examining to what extent shallow machine
learning classifiers, with basic pre-processing technique, can achieve in terms of accuracy. The
authors conducted multiple experiments to examine twenty-two different machine learning
approaches. Th training was conducted using the SecReq [59] dataset and the results showcased
that ensemble techniques such as LSTM Ensemble Boosted Trees and CNN gave the best
accuracy performance. requirements. Despite that fact that the Long Short-Term Memory
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(LSTM) reached the highest accuracy level, the authors recommend the use of supervised
machine learning classification approaches in the context of security requirement. Since deep
learning approaches such as the LSTM exhibit longer training time that might not be suitable for
instant and fast classification.
In another paper published by Kurtanovic et al.[32] on the use of supervised learning
machine learning to classify requirements as either functional (FR) or non-functional (NFR).
This classification was conducted on the “Quality attributes (NFR)” dataset. Furthermore, the
non-functional requirements were identified as either usability, security, operational, or
performance requirements. The process the authors adopted in this work consisted of first
identifying whether a security requirement is a functional or a non-functional requirement. In
doing so the most informative features in the text were also identified and the top ten were
selected to conclude the classification. For the non-functional requirements further classification,
the authors filtered out the functional requirements from the dataset and then assessed four
binary classifiers for identifying the four most frequent NFRs in the dataset: usability, security,
operational, and performance. Then a multi-class classifier was used for predicting these four
classes.
Abad et al. [1] work tackles classifying requirements into functional requirements (FR)
and non-functional ones (NFR), and how automated classification of requirements into FR and
NFR can be improved. The proposed approach introduced a preprocessing solution that
standardizes and normalizes requirements before applying the classification algorithms. By
leveraging rich sentence features and latent co-occurrence relations, the authors showcased
improved results in precision when the classification was applied to the processed dataset using
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the proposed technique. In addition to this work the authors also conducted an analysis to
showcase the performance of several existing machine learning methods that are used for the
automatic classification. This study was conducted on 625 requirements provided by the
OpenScience tera-PROMISE repository.
Dave et al. [10] also used the PROMISE repository dataset of functional and nonfunctional requirements, to conduct their experiments. The main premises of this work was to
automate the classification of software requirements into FN and NF requirements, and to further
classify the NF requirements into nine different categories. Using three machine learning
algorithms, SVM, Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD), and Random Forests, the authors
conducted a comparison of these machine learning performances. Where the results showed that,
SVM with TF-IDF produced the best results when classifying FRs, the SGD with TF-IDF
produced the best results for NFRs, and in the case of both FRs and NFRs, the 3 models
produced quite similar results.
Another consideration regarding the elicitation of software requirements was brought to
light by Emebo et al.[11,44] work on identifying the Implicit Requirements (IMRs) of a said
system. IMRs are assumed needs that a system is expected to fulfill though not elicited during
requirements gathering. The authors highlight that addressing such requirements is crucial for the
completeness and success of the overall system. Especially that, studies have shown that a major
factor in the failure of software systems is the presence of unhandled IMRs. To address this issue
the authors, propose a novel framework called the COTIR (Commonsense knowledge, Ontology
and Text mining for Implicit Requirements) for identifying and managing IMRs based on
combining three core technologies: common sense knowledge, text mining and ontology.
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Additionally, and building on the COTIR tool, Emebo et al.[43] conducted another work which
incorporates CNN-based deep learning to further enhance the COTIR detection of IMRs from
complex SRS big data such as images and tables. This approach aimed to deploy a Convolutional
Neural Network (CNN) for further analysis of IMRs. This enhanced COTIR framework ability to
extract IMRs was evaluated using three SRS documents and compared against eight software
engineering experts (SE researchers and IT professionals). Where, the eight study participants
first carefully read each of the SRS documents supplied to them and identified requirements with
implicit patterns. As a result of this manual effort, all participants collectively were able to
identify 8 potential IMRs. The COTIR tool was then used to identify the following types of
implicit patterns in the SRS documents: i) Ambiguity, ii) Incomplete Knowledge, iii) Vagueness,
and iv) Miscellaneous. The experts’ evaluation served as the ground truth. A major result of this
study was that the COTIR approach was able to identify 6 out of 8 known instances of implicit
patterns in the supplied requirements. The authors conclude that, such results provide evidence
that COTIR can relieve human analysts from the tedious manual task of reading huge SRS
documents to find IMRs.
What is worth mentioning here is that several approaches and studies were conducted to
classify natural text as functional requirements (FR) or non-functional requirements, and/or the
NFR were classified as security, performance, usability. However, there is clear shortage in
addressing the classification of security requirements as a specific principle of their own.
Security requirements intertwine with all categories of requirements, and many security
requirements can be expressed as functional requirements, performance, availability, and
usability. Thus, security requirements must be extracted from functional requirements and nonfunctional requirements alike to achieve the completeness of the security requirements elicitation
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process and aid the shift of how to address security concerns and issue in software systems. With
that, this work will retain from any pre-classification and instead will aim to extract security
requirements from any sentence described as a requirement.
1.2.2 Security Requirements Prioritization
The extraction and identification of security requirements appears to be the focus of most
of the current literature work when it comes to the use of automation and machine learning
technologies. Which draws the attention to the lack of such automated frameworks for the
purpose of prioritizing security requirements. However, there are significant work that addresses
the issue and suggests feasible process to manually elicit, identify, and prioritize security
requirements. Even though such frameworks require experts’ skill and significant efforts, they
still provide sufficient aid for software engineers. For example, Yoo et al. [58] proposed a rather
easy to understand and implement technique for prioritizing security requirements, which the
authors called the enhanced misuse-case. The enhanced misuse-case extends upon the wellestablished use-case diagram. This is perhaps what is most appealing about this approach. The
proposed solution addresses the prioritization of security requirements in terms of the number of
functional requirements and/or assets each security requirement is addressing. In addition to the
risks value that each security requirement is trying to mitigate. The authors suggest calculating
this risk value using the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
In another work presented by Carvalho et al. [8] that was mainly concerned with the
security issues and incidents associated with smart toys that uses sensors and cloud-based
services to collect data. To adequately address these security issues associated with such
systems, the authors proposed an approach where they used the Microsoft SDL method to

21

identify a comprehensive list of security issues based on specific regulations, threats based on
surface attack analysis, and security requirements that address security issues and threats. As for
prioritization, the authors presented a method based on risk assessment, AHP, and generic
scenarios. The suggested process to prioritize security requirements requires to first, identify the
severity of all threats addressed by the security requirements using the security bug bar. Second,
the severity of all security issues addressed by the security requirements must be defined using
standards and regulations that must be considered in the context of a system. Finally, the risk of
each security requirement is calculated based on the severity of the threats and the security issues
addressed by it. This final value is then used to prioritize the security requirement. In the case of
security requirements with the same risk values the authors suggest that using the AHP
techniques provides the most reliable results.
Park et al. [45] approach for prioritizing security requirements facilitates the threat
modeling model to create a process that allows for the prioritization of security requirements via
the valuation of assets, threats, and countermeasures. Modeled in a tree-like structured graph
referred to as a “valuation graph”. The valuation graph requires a total of eight steps: six steps
that must proceed the prioritization scheme to achieve the prioritization, that is manifested in
seventh and eighth steps. The suggested prioritization scheme derives its principle from
identifying the system’s assets, the threats per asset, and their valuation in terms of impact and
risk. Once assets and threats and their values are well established, security requirements become
the countermeasures that can be used to mitigate and address these threats. The priority of these
security requirements is then calculated using the total impact (TI) of threats that a
countermeasure mitigates, the gain (G) of each countermeasure, and the value of assets that the
countermeasure protects.
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1.3 Contributions of this Study
The contributions of this work can be summarized as follows:
1. An enhanced dataset (called the SecREP dataset), which includes samples of
requirements classified as either a security requirement or non-security requirement. This
enhanced dataset is a combination of the SecReq [59] dataset and the NFR dataset
available on “zenodo.org” [52,60], in addition to some requirements gathered from
security requirements specifications documents.
2. A comparison between three machine learning models (SVM, Naïve Bayes, and Random
Forest) trained using the enhanced dataset.
3. A process that employs a voting ensemble approach for extracting security requirements
from software language artifacts (such as SRS documents).
4. A novel semi-automatic prioritization scheme for security requirements. This scheme
uses sentence features and relation extraction to identify assets, threats, and security
properties. In addition, the scheme uses a sentence similarity technique to identify threats
that correspond to STRIDE [30] modeling.
1.4 Thesis Structure
This thesis presents the Security Requirements Extraction and Prioritization Framework
(henceforth referred to as SecREP). The SecREP pipeline consists of two major parts: Part One,
wherein a machine learning based approach for security requirements identification/extraction is
proposed and evaluated; Part two, wherein a security requirements prioritization scheme is
proposed.
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The thesis structure is summarized in Figure 1 and a description of the two-step SecREP
pipeline is provided below.
Part One: this part represents the process and the steps taken to conduct the security
requirements extraction framework. The proposed extraction process was a result of the
following iterations:
1. Using the SecReq [59] dataset after manual cleaning, and modifications which yielded a
total of approximately 584 requirements.
2. Using the enhanced SecREP dataset, which included the SeqReq [59] dataset, a portion
of the NFR dataset [52,60] and manually extracted requirements from SRS documents
(total of 752 requirements)
3. For each iteration three machine learning models (SVM, Naïve Bayes, and Random
Forest) were trained, after applying preprocessing techniques to the input datasets. The
trained model was used to extract security requirements from a real-world system
requirements specification artifact (a list of 30 requirements). Using background
knowledge and judgment to evaluate the extracted security requirements list. Satisfactory
results were achieved in the third iteration using the enhanced SecREP dataset.
4. The performance for each model was evaluated in terms of precision, accuracy, recall,
and F1 scores. Using 80% training and 20% testing resampling approach as well as 5folds-cross validation.
5. The final extracted security requirements list was based on an ensemble decision where
all three trained models classified a requirement as a security requirement.

24

Part Two: the second part of this work represents the process and the steps taken to
conduct a prioritization scheme for the security requirements that were extracted from the
previous part (part one). The proposed prioritization process was a result of the following steps:
1. The extracted security requirements list from the ensemble extraction process, was
treated with preprocessing techniques to be normalize and reshaped.
2. Using spaCy [23] pretrained natural language medium model, feature extraction
techniques were applied on the processed security requirements list to identify the assets,
threats, and security attributes (such as Authentication, Integrity, Confidentiality…etc.)
that appear in the extracted list.
3. For each security requirement a total score was calculated based on the number of assets,
threats, and security properties present in the said security requirement.
4. For additional mapping, spaCy [23] Word2Vec text similarity algorithm was utilized to
calculate the similarity of each security requirement to a super-sentence. Each supersentence corresponds to a STRIDE [30]threat definition.
5. A weight of 1 was added to each STRIDE [30] threat that appears in the security
requirement, based on a similarity of at least 90% to each super-sentence.
6. The total count of STRIDE [30] similarity weight and the total count of assets, threats,
and security properties, becomes the priority score of the security requirement.
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Figure 1: Security Requirements Extraction and Prioritization Pipeline (SecREP)
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CHAPTER 2: Background
2.1 Requirements Engineering and Elicitation
Requirements Engineering (RE) is defined as the process of gathering, eliciting,
analyzing, documenting, and maintaining requirements in the software development process
[42]. Requirements engineering (RE) is an essential step that must proceed the design and
development of a software’s code [5]. This importance stems from the fact that addressing
requirements errors, such as ambiguous, incomplete, or omitted requirements, is more expensive
to fix when the software is operational. Due to that its notable that extensive work is done in the
early stages of the software development life cycle (SDLC).
An important outcome of the requirements’ engineering process is the elicitation of the
system’s requirements specification (SRS). Where the functional requirements are distinguished
from the nonfunctional requirements. Functional requirements are those that can directly relate to
an action the system is expected to perform as per the end-user expectations. Nonfunctional
requirements on the other hand are more ambiguous to derive and normally refer to those
requirements that express a system’s constraint or quality, such as performance, reliability,
efficiency, and security[21,34] . Table 1 Provides examples of functional and nonfunctional
requirements to clarify the differences between the two concepts.
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Table 1: Examples of Functional and Nonfunctional Requirements
Requirement Example

Category

The system should allow users to change the Functional requirement: allows for changing
color scheme of the website.

colors.

Ability to upload large pictures and videos of up Nonfunctional
to 5Gb

requirement:

performance,

load

Users should receive notifications of new Functional
features

requirement:

allows

for

notification action

The system should send emails to the users in Nonfunctional

requirement:

performance,

less than 3 seconds of adding new content to the efficiency
website
The system should allow users to interact with Functional
each other.

requirement:

allow

for

communication action

Warning and instructions issued by the system Nonfunctional requirement: reliability, user
should be, in English without disclosing any experience, security.
sensitive information. Error messages should be
colored red. Instruction messages should be
colored green.

2.1.1 Security Requirements Engineering
Security requirements are most categorized under the non-functional requirements of the
system. These types of requirements describe the constraint on the system’s functions, where
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these constraints operationalize one or more security goals [19]. Security requirements are
dynamic in nature and evolve as the software is developed. Most researchers classify them as
nonfunctional requirements because they do not have a clear criterion for their specification and
satisfiability [2]. However, security requirements can be also expressed as functional
requirements that describe the system’s behaviors to achieve these security goals of a said
system.
The process of security requirements engineering provides valuable information that
covers the definition of security requirements and the concepts that correlate with it like, assets,
objects, threats, and vulnerabilities. Which in turn provokes important questions, such as what
assets should be protected? Against whom? How should these assets be protected? And to what
extent? It is important to recognize that security requirements do not represent security measures
and policies, nor should they describe the underlying mechanisms that implement these security
measures. With that it is notable that security requirements are complex, and they integrate with
the general concept of requirements. Making the process of eliciting security requirements a
challenging task, that must be addressed early in the software’s development stages [8,31,54] .
When addressing security requirements, it is difficult to derive conclusive rules that can
be used to determine if a requirement is a security requirement or a non-security requirement.
The system’s needs and nature, the standards and regulations of the operational country and
environment, and the software engineers’ expatriates, are some of the important variables that
can drastically influence the categorization of a software requirement. However, guidelines and
standards can still be utilized to tackle the issue of deciding if a requirement is a security
requirement. For example, in information security confidentiality, integrity, and availability are
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broadly known as the security “Tried” and they are considered the three most important concepts
within information security. Considering these three principles and what they present, could
alone provide a sustainable start to define a security requirement, where a requirement could be
considered a security requirement if it addresses the protection of these concepts and/or the
prevention of the inverse of them. Table 2 Provides some examples of security requirements
expressed as functional and nonfunctional requirements.
Table 2: Security Requirements as Functional and Non-Functional Requirements.
Security Requirement as Functional

Security Requirements as Nonfunctional

requirements

requirements

The system must issue emails to users if their The system must protect users’ information
data was compromised

and prevent any illegal access to users’
sensitive data.

All secrete data must be encrypted/hashed and All critical functionalities must be available
must not be stored or transmitted in plain text and accessible to authorized users.
format.
The system must perform regular scanning to The system must guarantee the integrity of
any data entering the operational environment users’ assets stored and retrieved within the
as well as any user input.

system environment.

2.1.2 Prioritization of Security Requirements
Despite the significance of security in software applications. Implementing all security
measures is expensive in time, cost, and effort, in addition to the performance and availability
restrains that it might reflect on the system. Absolute software security is an unrealistic
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expectation. Thus, it is important to identify the topmost critical security requirements that must
be addressed and accounted for. Which in turn, guarantees that at least the most essential
protection measures are incorporated in the software’s early release [8].
Ideally security requirements prioritization must be considered as an essential task in the
process of requirements engineering. Additionally, the lack of a prioritization process could
leave the process of security requirements elicitation ambiguous and incomplete. Leaving the
decision of which security measures to be implemented to the expertise and skills of the software
engineers performing the elicitation. One might easily argue that without prioritization the
establishment of security requirements alone does not utilize them into tangible use. The optimal
purpose of security requirements is to support the objectives of a project and its overall quality.
Prioritization offers great value for risk-analysis and trade-of-analysis aiding stakeholders and
software engineers in making educated decisions. Many factors are at play when attempting to
prioritize software requirements more so for security requirements. Unlike clear requirements
that present the end-users and stakeholders needs, security requirements tend to be difficult to
evaluate and valuate[2,48,54]. However, a common criterion on how to address and guide the
process of security requirements prioritization can still be derived and established using the most
common factors found in a security requirement. Examples of these factors include, the system
and user assets, the security attribute being addressed according to the security tried
(confidentiality, integrity, and availability), the threats being addressed, and the risks associated
with these threats [8,16,22,26,45,51,58].
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2.2 Machine Learning and Natural Language Processing
Machine learning (ML) approaches have become in recent years, a necessary part in
numerous commercial and industrial applications and appliances. With the explosion of data
gathering and information mining, a new paradigm emerged where the use of ML is the
automatic determination for otherwise impossible, complex, and/or manual tasks. Such tasks and
applications include robotics, text and image recognition, fraud and anomalies detection,
intelligent chat bots, data classifications and predictions in whether, medical diagnosis, and
navigation...etc. [7,40].
Machine learning (ML): is the scientific study of algorithms and statistical methods that
computer systems use to effectively perform a specific task without using explicit instructions,
relying on patterns and inference instead. It is seen as a subset of artificial intelligence. Machine
learning algorithms build a mathematical model of sample data, known as "training data", in
order to make predictions or decisions without being explicitly programmed to perform the task.
There are five types of machine learning algorithms: supervised, semi-supervised, active
learning, reinforcement, and unsupervised learning [7,27,40].
Natural language processing (NLP): is a subset of artificial intelligence and a
significant filed machine learning. NLP refers to the process where a computer system is used to
understand, parse, and extract human language that is in the form of raw text in often times. NLP
is a broader term where several problem areas fall under it, such as text
categorization\classification, syntactic parsing, part-of-speech tagging (POS), named entity
recognition (NER), coreference resolution, machine translation, and the sub area of natural
language understanding (NLU). Natural language understanding (NRU) describes the area of
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NLP where the computer systems are trained to extract context, intent, and what is inclined by
the text. NLU is commonly used in areas such as, relation extraction, paraphrasing, semantic
parsing, sentiment analysis, question and answering, and summarization [4,27].
Figure 2 demonstrate the relation between these three fields (AI, ML and NLP), where is
Figure 3 demonstrate the problem areas where NLP and NLU are used in relation to each other.
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Figure 2: NLP in Relation to AI and ML

Figure 3: Natural Language Processing (NLP) Knowledge Areas
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2.2.1 Information Extraction and Text Classification
Information extraction and classification are both popular applications of NLP.
Information extraction focuses on transforming raw text into structured and relevant information
to the problem at hand. Whilst text classification is more concerned with labeling and grouping
the unstructured data with relation to its content into two or more classes. Text classification can
be used on either raw data or on restructured data that is the result of an information extraction
process [27,47]. Such pipeline has the potential of producing more accurate and powerful results
for many cases, as shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Information Extraction and Classification
2.2.2 Text Preprocessing
In machine learning approaches the most important factor that determines the quality of
the process outcome is the condition, completeness, and plausibility of the data that is being fed
to the machine for training. Incorrect or poor-quality input will always produce faulty output.
More so for NLP techniques, since making a numeric based machines such as computers
understand and derive meaning from human spoken languages is a far more difficult task than
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processing numeric data. Text preprocessing, describe the cleaning and preparing operations that
transforms the raw text, into a well-defined sequence of linguistically meaningful units. Raw text
datasets normally contain noisy, duplicated, lengthy, high dimensional, corrupted, and empty
data that is not valuable for the NLP task. Which makes preprocessing a vital step that must
proceed every NLP task to produce more accurate and reliable results [27,56]. Below is a
description for essential text preprocessing techniques that were also used in later chapters in this
work.
Manual cleaning: while many automated libraries exist that provide reliable text
preprocessing techniques, in some cases manual cleaning and validation of the dataset is still
necessary. For example, in some cases where many samples are unlabeled, experts’ judgment
will be required to provide an accurate classification and prevent losing the sample. In other
cases, reducing the sentence length would also be a manual task to ensure that this reduction did
not jeopardize the integrity and usefulness of that data sample [27].
General Cleaning: it is important to understand the dataset that will be used for the NLP
task. Therefore, it is advised to scan the text, understand its structure, and content. This helps
identify what cleaning processes might be needed. Additionally, as a rules of thumb, a general
cleaning step that includes removing extra white spaces and line breaks is always a good start to
a better dataset. This can be easily done with a simple automated codes and regular expressions.

Fixing Null and NaN values: Data needs to be checked for NaN and Null values. Such
values do not only compromise the training process but for many cases they can cause the
machine learning algorithm to fail its execution. Null and NaN values can be handled either
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manually or automatically after importing the data. In many cases it is recommended to fix the
sample where there is a null/Nan value instead of removing it [27]. This fix can be done
manually using expert judgment, or automatically using mean values or estimated values that can
fill the missing data.
Tokenization: or text segmentation is the process of converting a sentence into a series
of words. Each token carries a semantic meaning that is associated with it. The importance of
this process is that it breaks down larger pieces of text into smaller more meaningful ones. The
tokenization process can be achieved by defining the boundaries for a word and separating them
by whitespace and punctuation as well as splitting contractions [4,27].
Stop Words Removal: stop words are very abundant and common in natural language
artifacts, and they provide little to no value in terms of analyzing the special meanings of a given
text. Hence removing stop words reduces the noise in the given data and promotes better results.
Example of such strop words include auxiliary verbs (be, do and have), conjunctions (and, or)
and articles (the, a, and an) [4,25,27].
Stemming and Lemmatization: Stemming refers to reducing inflected (or sometimes
derived) words to their word stem base or root. For example, the words ‘goes’, ’gone’ and
‘going’ will map to ‘go’. Lemmatization on the other hand determines the lemma (the infinitive
form of verbs and the singular form of nouns and adjectives) of each word. For example, the
verbs ("see", "saw", "seeing", "seen"}) will all map to “see”. Both or either techniques can be
used depending on the task at hand, to improve the accuracy of the result, and to reduce the
overhead of finding text similarity problems. However, lemmatization is often recommended and
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is broadly regarded as more useful than stemming, since it adds a morphological analysis to the
words [4,12,27].
Punctuation Removal: similar to stop words, punctuations also add extra noise to the
data that might affect the tokenization, classification, and extraction processes. However, for
some scenarios it might be necessary to keep some punctuations, for example to detect the end of
a sentence, extract questions, extract quoted phrases…etc. [12,27].
Convert to Lowercase: converting the text to lowercase is vital for text parsing,
similarity extraction, and words vector presentations. For example, the words “Apple” and
“apple” will be given different numerical and weight values. While in essence these words serve
the same purpose and meaning.
Part of Speech (POS) Tagging: in linguistic features, text is analyzed to extract features
related to the interested objective. Part of Speech (POS) tagging involves tagging a word with a
part of speech label (such as noun, verb, adjective, etc.) based on the definition and its context
within the sentence in which it is found [12,23].
2.2.3 Word vectors
Word vectors or word embeddings are numerical representations of words in
multidimensional space through metrices. It is well established that, the working language of
computers is numbers. Which represents a challenge for natural language processing and words
analysis from the perspective of the computer architecture. With that said, many methods were
established to address this limitation where words are converted into corresponding unique
numbers the computers can understand and process quickly. This process of encoding documents
in a numeric feature space is called feature extraction or, vectorization.
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One of those initial methods, is the bag of words, where words are stored in a dictionary,
each word is that dictionary key and its numerical representation is the value. For example,
{“the”: 1, “she”: 3} etc. However, in such method and while the computer can recognize the
word, it is unable to identify or derive meaning of it, in terms of how that word functions within
a sentence, how it works within a language, and how it relates to other words. Word vectors on
the other hand, add dimensionality to the word, where a word is represented by an array of
decimal numbers. These dimensions are honed via machine learning models that consider the
frequency of that word alongside words across a body of text, in addition to, the appearance of
other words in similar contexts. This allows for the computer to determine the syntactical
similarity of words numerically. Hence why, vectorization is often referred to as Feature
selection. Word vectors approaches use Matrices to represent these relationships numerically. To
represent these matrices more concisely, models flatten a matrix to a float (decimal number)
where the number of dimensions represent the number of floats in the matrix [4,6,27].
Below is a description of two vectorization models that were used in later chapters of this
work.

2.2.3.1 Term Frequency—Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF)
The TF-IDF approach is very commonly used for vectorizing terms and extracting
features based on occurrence. It is used in many search engines, information retrieval, and text
mining systems. TF-IDF combines two metrics, the raw frequency value of a term in a particular
document (TF), and the inverse of the document frequency for each term (IDF).
The term frequency TF of a word w in a document can be calculated as follows:
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Number of times the word w occurs in a document
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The inverse of the document frequency IDF for each term w can be calculated as follows:

 = )ݓ(ܨܦܫlog

Total number of documents
Number of documents containing word w

Finally, the weight of word w in document d can be calculated as follows:
ݓ(ݐ݄݃݅݁ݓ, ݀) = ܶݓ(ܨ, ݀))ݓ(ܨܦܫݔ
Hence and according to the above equations, the weight of word w in document d is the
product of the TF of word w in document d and the IDF of word w across the text corpus.
[6,27,35].

2.2.3.2 Word2vec
Word2vec [39] was introduced by Google in 2013 and it was developed by Mikolov et a
l. At Google. Later the model was made available as an open source for the community to use
and build on [27]. In essence the Word2vec is a model that enables the building of word vectors
using contextual information from the neighborhood of a word. For every word whose
embedding is developed, it's based on the words around it. Word2Vec is a pre-trained two-layer
neural network, that takes as input a text corpus and outputs a set of feature vectors that represent
words in that corpus [27,39]. Word2vec models can be trained by two approaches, as follows:
x

Continuous Bag Of Words: this approach takes as input the context of each and tries to
predict the word corresponding to the context. Where the context in this case is the
surrounding words.
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x

Skip-gram: the skip-gram predicts the context word using the target word as input. In
this approach the target word, (i.e., the word to generate a representation for) is used to
predict the context.
Figure 5 showcases a simple representation of the two approaches that can be used to

train a Word2Vec model.

Figure 5: Word2vec Continuous Bag Of Words and Skip-gram Training Methods
2.3 Text Similarity
Text similarity from the perspective of the machine is the distance between two vectors
where the vector dimensions represent the features of two objects. Similarity provides insights
into the distance between two vectors and measures how different or alike two data objects are.
If the distance is small, the objects are said to have a high degree of similarity and vice versa.
Once the vector representation of the text, or the text embedding is established, text similarity
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becomes a simple distance task that can be calculated using simple well-known mathematical
equations, such as the Euclidean Distance and the Cosine similarity [23,27].
2.4 Naïve Bayes
The Naïve Bayes (NB) is a classification technique based on the Bayes' theorem: the
basic assumption is that the predictor variables are independent of each other. It is a statistical
classifier that performs probabilistic prediction. A simple naïve Bayesian classifier has
comparable performance with decision tree and selected neural network classifier.
The Bayes' theorem is mathematically expressed as follows:

ܲ(= )ܤ|ܣ

ܲ()ܣ(ܲ)ܣ|ܤ
ܲ()ܤ

:KHUH$DQG%DUHHYHQWVDQG3 % 
x

P(A) and P(B) are the probabilities of observing A and B without regard to each other.

x

P(A|B), a conditional probability, is the probability of observing event A give that B is
true.

x

P(B|A) is the probability of observing event B given that A is true
For a text classification problem, A can be set to the probability that a specific word

vector/ words vectors belongs to the targeted class, and B as the entire vectors in the vocabulary
set. If P(A|B) > P(¬A|B), then a sentence can be classified accordingly [4,6,12,27,40].
2.5 Support Vector Machines
Support Vector Machines (SVM) is a supervised classification method that works for
both linear and nonlinear data. The SVM algorithm aims to find the optimal hyperplane (i.e.,
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Decision Boundary) that separates the data points that need to be classified. Naturally, there are
many possible hyperplanes that could be chosen. However, the objective is to find a plane that
has the maximum distance between data points of both classes (i.e., the margin between the two
classes data points).
Hyperplanes: the decision boundaries that separate the data points. Data points falling on
either side of the hyperplane can be attributed to different classes. The dimensionality of a
hyperplane correlates to the number of features each date point presents. If the number of
features is 2, the hyperplane is just a line. If the number of features is 3, then the hyperplane
becomes a two-dimensional plane. Figure 6 demonstrates the SVM hyperplanes.

Figure 6: SVM Hyperplanes
Support vectors: are considered as the critical elements of a dataset. These represent the
data points closest to the decision boundary. Consequently, if these points are removed, altered,
or the data is changed, the position of the dividing hyperplane will be changed and recalculated.
The margin: the distance between the hyperplane and the nearest data point from either
class is known as the margin.
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Maximum marginal hyperplane (MMH): the hyperplane with the greatest possible
margin which yields a greater chance of new data being classified correctly.
Figure 7 demonstrates the SVM support vectors and margins.

Figure 7: SVM Support Vectors and Margins
Calculating the hyperplane and the margin:
SVM algorithm takes the output of the well-known linear function (y=mx+b) and if that
output is greater than 1, the point is placed in one class and if the output is -1, it’s places with
another class. Since the threshold values are 1 and -1 in SVM, this reinforcement range of
values ([-1,1]) can be obtained, and act as margin.
The separating hyperplane function is defined as follows:
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where W= {w1, w2, …, wn} is a weight vector, and b is a scalar called the bias. The
margin can then be calculated as:
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The goal of the SVM as mentioned before, is to determine the weight vector w and bias b
that maximize the margin m to create a distinct hyperplane that satisfies the following constrains:

݂( = )ݔ൜
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െ1 ݂݅  ݓ௧ ݔ + ܾ  െ1

Where f(x) is the decision function used to create a distinct separating hyperplane that
classify input data in either positive or negative class [4,6,14,18,27,56].
2.6 Random Forest
Random forest (RF) classifiers fall under the broad umbrella of decision trees and
ensemble-based learning methods. Random forests are proven to be a very powerful and
successful techniques in pattern recognition and machine learning for high-dimensional
classification. As the name suggests, random forests consist of a large number of individual
decision trees that operate as an ensemble. Each individual tree in the random forest produces a
class prediction and the class with the majority vote (mode) across them becomes the model’s
prediction. Among other benefits, this voting approach has the effect of correcting for the
undesirable property of decision trees to overfit training data. The reason for this effect is the low
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correlation between the models. Where the trees protect each other from their individual errors
(assuming the low probability of all trees constantly producing similar errors).
In the training stage, random forests apply a technique known as bagging to individual
trees in the ensemble. Bagging allows each individual tree to repeatedly select a random sample
from the dataset with replacement, resulting in different trees. Each tree is grown without any
pruning. The number of trees in the ensemble is a free parameter learned automatically using the
out-of-bag error (OOB). The OOB error is the average error for each bootstrap sample calculated
using predictions from the trees that do not contain in their respective that bootstrap sample. This
allows the random forest classifier to be fit and validated during its training. Hence, the random
forest, generates trees that are not only trained on different sets of data (du to bagging) but also
use different features to make decisions. Figure 8 demonstrate how a random forest model is split
into different decision trees using different features for each sub tree. [3,12,14].

Figure 8: Node splitting in a Random Forest Model
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2.7 Performance Measures
Performance measures in machine learning are used to evaluate the correctness and
completeness of the trained model performance in a specific classification problem. These
performance metrics include accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-score. Such metrics provide
tangible insight regarding the strengths and limitations of these trained models, especially when
making predictions on new samples.
True Positive (TP): true positive measures how well the model can correctly predict the
positive class. Where the model predicts that a data sample is positive, and it is actually positive.
False Positive (FP): false positive is the case when the model wrongly predicts the class
of a given data sample. That is, a data ample classified under the negative class, but the model
retrieves it as a positive class sample.
True Negative (TN): true negative measures how well the model can correctly predict
the negative class. Where the model predicts that a data sample is negative, and it is actually
negative.
False Negative (FN): false negative is the case when the model wrongly predicts the
class of a given data sample. That is, a data ample classified under the positive class, but the
model retrieves it as a negative class sample.
The Precision Score: measures the proportion of positively predicted labels that are
actually correct. Precision is also known as the positive predictive value. Precision is used in
conjunction with the recall to trade-off false positives and false negatives. Precision is affected
by the class distribution. If there are more samples in the minority class, then precision will be
lower. The precision score of a model can be calculated using the following equation:
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TP
(FP + TP)

Where TP is the machine learning model true positive measure, and FP is its false
positive measure.
The Recall Score: represents the model’s ability to correctly predict the positives out of
actual positives. Unlike precision which measures how many predictions made by models are
actually positive out of all positive predictions made. Thus, when calculating the recall score the
value of the model’s false-negative measure would impact the recall score. The recall score for a
model can be calculated using the following equation

ܴ݈݈݁ܿܽ ܵܿ= ݁ݎ

TP
(FN + TP)

Where TP is the machine learning model true positive measure, and FN is its false
negative measure.
The Accuracy Score: is described as the ratio of true positives and true negatives to all
positive and negative observations. Accuracy provides insight into how often a machine learning
model will correctly predict an outcome out of the total number of times it made predictions.
Mathematically, it represents the ratio of the sum of true positive and true negatives out
of all the predictions. The accuracy of a machine learning model can be calculated using the
following equation:

= ݁ݎܿܵ ݕܿܽݎݑܿܿܣ

(TP + TN)
(TP + FN + TN + FP)
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Where TP is the machine learning model true positive measure, FP is its false positive,
FN is its false negative measure, and TN is its true negative measure.
The F1-Score: represents the model’s score as a function of its precision and recall. The
F1-score gives equal weights to the model’s Precision and Recall scores to measure its
performance in terms of accuracy. Making it an alternative to Accuracy metrics (it doesn’t
require us to know the total number of observations). It’s often used as a single value that
provides high-level information about the model’s output quality. The F1-Score for a machine
learning model can be calculated using the following equation:

ܨ1 െ ܵܿ= ݁ݎ

2  כPrecision Score  כRecall Score
Precision Score + Recall Score

49

CHAPTER 3: Isolating Security Requirements from Requirements
Datasets
The objective of this thesis work is to 1) produce an automatic framework that extracts
security related requirements from a software system’s natural language artifacts, for example, a
Software Requirements Specification document (an SRS). And 2) to produce a prioritization
scheme where the extracted list of security requirements can be further refined into a prioritized
list. This section represents the design and approach adopted to tackle the first step in the
SecREP pipeline showed before in Section 1.4.
3.1 The Datasets
The datasets used in this work’s experiments, were mainly the SecReq [59] dataset, and
the NFR [52,60] dataset. Both datasets were obtained online from “zenodo.org”.
3.1.1 SecReq Dataset
The SecRecq dataset introduced by Houmb et al. [24] Is composed of three industrial
SRS documents: Customer Premises Network (CPN), Common Electronic Purse (ePurse), and
Global Platform Specification (GPS). In total the dataset contains 510 samples of non-functional
requirements labeled as either a security requirement or non-security requirement.
Table 3 provides examples form the SecReq dataset.
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Table 3: Requirements Samples from the SecReq Dataset
SRS

Requirement Description

Label

The CNG may support mechanisms supporting nomadism of the

Non-security

Document
CPN

users and their subscribed services from one physical customer
environment to another.
The diagnostic operations on the CPN by an operator shall be

Security

performed in accordance with rules protecting the users' privacy.
ePurse

A single currency cannot occupy more than one slot. The CEP

Non-security

card must not permit a slot to be assigned a currency if another
slot in the CEP card has already been assigned to that currency.
Load and unload functions must be authenticated using end-to-

Security

end security between the card and the card issuer.
GPS

The Card Issuer is responsible for Working with Application

Non-security

Providers to create and initialize Security Domains other than
the Issuer Security Domain.
"The Card Issuer is responsible for Enforcing standards and
policies for Application Providers governing all aspects of
Applications to be provided to the Card Issuer or operated on the
Card Issuer's cards.

Security
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3.1.2 The NFR Dataset
The NFR [52,60] dataset that can be accessed on “zenodo.org” is also known as the
PROMISE dataset. This dataset can be attributed to Jane Cleland-Huang and was provided for
the RE'17 Data Challenge [9]. It was first made available on the PROMISE Software
Engineering Repository [52]
The NFR [60] software requirements dataset contains a total of 625 software
requirements sentences. All requirements not labeled with “F” are non-functional with the
following types: A=Availability, L = Legal, LF = Look and feel, MN = Maintainability, O =
Operational, PE = Performance, SC = Scalability, SE = Security, US = Usability, FT = Fault
tolerance, and PO = Portability. Table 4 provides examples form the NFR dataset.
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Table 4: Requirements Samples from the NFR Dataset
Requirement Description

Label

The system shall display the Events in a graph by time.

F

The product shall be available for use 24 hours per day 365 days per year.

A

The product shall retain user preferences in the event of a failure

FT

The System shall meet all applicable accounting standards. The final version of the L
System must successfully pass independent audit performed by a certified auditor.
The website shall be attractive to all audiences. The website shall appear to be fun, and LF
the colors should be bright and vibrant.
The product must be highly configurable for use with various database management MN
systems for the end users.

80% of end users are able to integrate new database

management systems with the product without changing the product’s software code.
The product is expected to integrate with multiple database management systems. The O
product will operate with Oracle SQL Server DB2 MySQL HSQL and MS Access.
The search results shall be returned no later 30 seconds after the user has entered the PE
search criteria.
The product is expected to run on Windows CE and Palm operating systems.

PO

system shall be able to handle all the user requests/usage during business hours.

SC

Only authorized users shall have access to clinical site information.

SE

The system shall be used by realtors with no training.

US
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3.1.3 The Enhanced Dataset (SecREP)
The SecREP enhanced dataset was the result of multiple iterations experimenting with
three different combinations of the SecReq dataset [59] and the NFR dataset [60], in addition to
requirements that were handpicked from general SRS documents. In each iteration the dataset
was revisited for further enhancement and expansion until satisfactory results were reached.
These alterations made to the datasets were a result of a number of issues that were
encountered working with the above datasets.
The issues with the SecReq [59]dataset are summarized as follows:
1. The dataset’s security requirements samples are all expressed as non-functional
requirements. Which would jeopardize the completeness of extracting all security
related requirements, since and as explained before, security requirements
intertwine with functional and non-functional requirements.
2. The dataset contained a significant number of corrupted data, large sentences, null
values, unlabeled samples, and samples labeled as security requirements in a
subset of the dataset and non-security in another.
3. Removing these corrupted, unclear, and unlabeled samples will significantly
reduce the size of the dataset (from 510 to 375). This, consequently, made the
machine learning models predictions considerably poor and unreliable.
The issues with the NFR dataset [60] are summarized as follows:
1. Similar to the case with the SecReq dataset [59], all security requirements are
classified as non-functional requirements. Additionally, the 11 categories of NFR
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could also be expressing a security concern, and thus a considerable amount of
these requirements can also be extracted as security requirements.
2.

Manually adjusting the classification of the 625 records, to transform the

dataset into the shape that servers the classification problem at hand requires
multiple experts ruling, taxing time, and considerable effort to ensure the
correctness and completeness of such a large-scale problem.
To address these issues, multiple experiments were conducted with different
combinations of the available datasets. Each experiment/iteration helped improve the prediction
of the trained machine learning models.
First Iteration: using a cleaned version of the SecReq dataset [59] where all corrupted,
unlabeled, unclear requirements where removed. Which yielded a total of 375 requirements
classified as either security or non-security. After using preprocessing techniques to reshape and
vectorize the text. The processed list was fed to the machine learning models namely: SVM,
Naive Bayes and RF. Despite the good performance measures scores, all models exhibited poor
predictions when subjected to a list of requirements from an SRS document.
Second Iteration: in this iteration using educated judgments, the raw SecReq [59] was
manually cleaned, fixed, and reshaped as follows:
1. Corrupted records were rewritten.
2. Unclassified entries were labeled.
3.

Some large and unclear requirements samples were split into 2 or more
requirements and labeled accordingly.
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4.

Finally, requirements that were classified as “unknown” were addressed and
added to the list. Which yielded a total of 584 requirements classified as either
security or non-security.

After using preprocessing techniques to reshape and vectorize the text. Theis processed
list was fed to the machine learning models namely: SVM, Naive Bayes and RF. Despite the
good performance measures scores, all models exhibited poor predictions when subjected to a
list of requirements from an SRS document.
Third Iteration: in this iteration the cleaned 584 requirements extracted from the
SecReq dataset [59] were combined with some samples obtained from the NFR [60] dataset.
The sample selection criteria applied on the NFR [60]dataset was as follows:
1. All requirements marked as “LF” (look and feel), and “US” (usability) were
added to the list and labeled as non-security requirements. Since it is safe to
assume that these types of requirements do not express a direct security concern
on the system’s functionality and/or operations in its environment.
2. All requirements marked as “L” (legal) where classified as non-security
requirements. Examining the provided samples that are labeled as “legal”
requirements. It was determined that even though these may contain security
related terms and vocabulary, they do not represent security concerns that effect
the system functionality and ability to operate in its environment. And hence this
classification would yield more reliable results identifying the security
requirements that address operational threats.
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3. All requirements marked as “SE” (security) were added to the list and labeled as
security requirements.
4. All requirements marked as “A” (availability) were added to the list and labeled
as security requirements. Since availability has a direct correlation to the security
CIA Triad (Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability).
5. Functional requirements labeled with “F” and the remaining non-functional
requirements (SC, PO, PE, O, MN, and FT) were excluded from the final dataset.
6. Finally, several handpicked samples of security requirements and non-security
requirements from general SRS documents were added. In order to further expand
the diversity and coverage of the dataset.
The combined and enhanced dataset was then subjected to preprocessing techniques and
transformed into a machine digestible form. The processed list consisting of a total of 752
requirements, was then fed to the machine learning models namely: SVM, Naive Bayes and RF.
Despite the slight drop in performance measures scores, all models exhibited improved
predictions when subjected to a list of requirements from an SRS document. The validation on
this iteration concluded that the predictions results were satisfactory.
Table 5 shows the difference in the predictions results between the SecReq dataset [59]
used in “Iteration Two” and the SecREP dataset used in “Iteration Three”.
The enhanced SecREP dataset is available on the following link, and can be made
available for interested researchers upon request:
https://github.com/shadakhanneh/SecREP-Dataset
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Table 5: Machine Learning Predictions Results Comparison
Requirement description

Iteration Two (Clean and

Iteration Three (SecREP)

fixed SecReq dataset)
The

system

should

support Machine

Prediction

Machine

secure virtual private network Learning

Learning

connections

Model

Model
SVM

Non-security

Naive Bayes Non-security
Random

Non-security

Forest
The system should be extensible SVM
to

provide

access

to

mobile data terminals

Random

Security

Security

Forest

The system should be designed SVM

minimal requirements on the

Random

Security

Naive Bayes

Security

Random

Security

SVM

Security

Naive Bayes

Security

Random

Security

Forest
Non-security

for access through browser- Naive Bayes Non-security
based systems and must impose

SVM

Forest

the Naive Bayes Non-security

interfaces through PDA’s and

Prediction

Non-security

Forest

SVM

Security

Naive Bayes

Security

Random

Security

Forest

client device
Use of AJAX based technology SVM

Non-security

to improve user experience. Naive Bayes Non-security

SVM

Non-security

Naive Bayes

Non-security
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Aggressive page loading to be Random

Non-security

considered based on the screen Forest

Random

Non-security

Forest

and estimate usage pattern
3.2 Data Preprocessing
In machine learning approaches the most important factor that determines the quality of
the process outcome is the condition, completeness, and plausibility of the data that is being fed
to the machine for training. Incorrect or poor-quality input will always produce faulty output. for
NLP techniques the raw text requires considerable preprocessing in order to transform it into a
digestible form that the machine can process and understand. Raw text datasets normally contain
noisy, duplicated, lengthy, high dimensional, corrupted, and empty data that is not valuable for
the NLP task. This makes preprocessing a vital step that must proceed every NLP task to
produce more accurate and reliable results. Detailed descriptions for each text preprocessing
technique used in this work’s experiments is provided in Section 2.2.2
The below listed text preprocessing techniques were performed before feeding the
SecREP to the machine learning models.
1. Manual cleaning and Null/NaN values substitution, which were performed
inherently while producing the enhanced dataset. As described before in Section
3.1.
2. Stop words, non-numeric and punctuation removal
3. Stemming and lemmatization
4. Lower case text conversion
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5. Part-of-speech (POS) tagging to understand if the word is noun or verb or
adjective…etc.
6. Vectorization using Term Frequency—Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF).
Additionally in the context of text preprocessing, negation handling represents a common
issue that must be taken into account especially in sentiment analysis problems. However,
for the problem at hand, negations were considered irrelevant and hence removed. This
decision was made based on the observation, that a security requirement is classified as
such depending on what it offers to the system or what it prevents or both. For example, a
requirement could be considered a security requirement if it is addressing the act of
“access” or the act of “no access”, where both cases will provide similar outcomes to the
classification prediction.
Table 6 shows examples of the dataset before and after applying the preprocessing
techniques.
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Table 6: Dataset Text Examples Before and After Preprocessing
Original Requirement Text

Requirement Text after Preprocessing

Successful authentication is a Successful

authentication

Label

prerequisite Security

prerequisite for the processing of processing offline ceps transaction.
any on-line or offline CEPS
transaction
In the case of an unlinked load, case unlinked load presumption may make Non security
no presumption may be made as business relationship cardholder fund issuer
to

the

between

business
the

relationship card issuer load acquirer

cardholder,

the

funds issuer, the card issuer, or
the load acquirer

3.3 Machine Learning Techniques
This section describes the training and validation processes adopted to train the selected
machine learning models, which are the SVM, Naive Bayes and Random Forest (These models
are explained in detail in Chapter 2 Background). These three models are highly regarded and
widely praised to exhibit accurate results in classification tasks. Especially for small-size
datasets. Where despite the enhanced SecREP dataset of 752 records, is still the case. For
example, machine learning models such as the Convolution Neural Networks (CNN), Recurrent
Neural Networks (RNN) are known to require thousands of samples to produce satisfactory
result.
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3.3.1 Training
The three selected machine learning models: SVM, Naive Bayes and Random Forest,
were trained using the Scikit-Learn library [50] implementation. After applying the selected
preprocessing steps described earlier in Section 3.2. These pre-built models were trained using
the cleaned 584-SecReq dataset, and the enhanced SecREP dataset of 752 requirements. Two
validation methods were applied in each training experiment: Resampling and N-Folds Cross
Validation. The performance of each model was assessed using the performance measure:
Precision, Recall, Accuracy, and the F1-Score. These performance measures or metrics are
described in detail in Section 2.7.
3.3.2 Experiment 1
Using the 584-SecReq dataset, the three machine learning models were trained and
validated using a resampling of 80% training and 20% testing and a 5-folds cross validation.
Additionally, the performance metrics for each validation approach were calculated.
The resulting training curve for each model is exhibited in Figure 9.

Figure 9: Machine Learning Models Learning Curve for the SecReq Dataset Training
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The performance metrics results for each machine learning model using resampling of
80% for training and 20% for validating are showcased in Table 7 and Figure 10. While the 5folds cross validation performance metrics results are showed in Table 8 and Figure 12.
Table 7: Performance Measures Results Using the SecReq Dataset and 20% Resampling
Validation
Model

Accuracy

correctly

Precision Recall

classified samples

F1

Score

Score

Naive Bayes (NB)

85.47

100

0.81

0.71

0.76

Support Vector Machine

92.30

108

0.89

0.86

0.88

90.59

106

0.90

0.78

0.84

(SVM)
Random Forest (RF)

Figure 10: Performance Measures Results Graph Using the SecReq Dataset and 20%
Resampling Validation
Figure 11 below illustrates the confusion metrics used in calculating the performance scores for
each model.
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Figure 11: Machine Learning Models Confusion Metrics for the SecReq Dataset Training
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Table 8: Performance Measures Results Using the SecReq Dataset and 5-Folds Cross
Validation
Model

Mean

Mean

Mean Recall

Mean F1

Accuracy

Precision

Score

Score

Naive Bayes (NB)

0.70

0.77

0.67

0.64

Support Vector Machine

0.70

0.76

0.68

0.66

0.67

0.75

0.64

0.60

(SVM)
Random Forest (RF)

Figure 12: Performance Measures Results Graph Using the SecReq Dataset and 5-Folds
Cross Validation
3.3.3 Experiment 2
Using the SecREP dataset, the three machine learning models were trained and validated
using a resampling of 80% training and 20% testing and a 5-folds cross validation. Additionally,
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the performance metrics for each validation approach were calculated. The resulting training
curve for each model is exhibited in Figure 13.

Figure 13: Machine Learning Models Learning Curve for the SecREP Dataset Training
The performance metrics results for each machine learning model using resampling of
80% for training and 20% for validating are showcased in Table 9 and Figure 14. While the 5folds cross validation performance metrics results are showed in Table 10 and Figure 16. These
Table 9: Performance Measures Results Using the SecREP Dataset and 20% Resampling
Validation
Model

Accuracy

correctly

Precision Recall

classified samples

F1

Score

Score

Naive Bayes (NB)

92.71

140

89

0.93

0.91

Support Vector Machine

93.37

141

0.90

0.93

0.92

90.59

136

0.89

0.85

0.87

(SVM)
Random Forest (RF)
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Figure 14: Performance Measures Results Graph Using the SecREP Dataset and 20%
Resampling Validation
Figure 15 below illustrates the confusion metrics used in calculating the performance scores for
each model.

Figure 15: Machine Learning Models Confusion Metrics for the SecREP Dataset Training
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Table 10: Performance Measures Results Using the SecREP Dataset and 5-Folds Cross
Validation
Model

Mean

Mean

Mean Recall

Mean F1

Accuracy

Precision

Score

Score

Naive Bayes (NB)

0.68

0.76

0.68

0.65

Support Vector Machine

0.71

0.77

0.71

0.68

0.65

0.71

0.65

0.62

(SVM)
Random Forest (RF)

Figure 16: Performance Measures Results Graph Using the SecREP Dataset and 5-Folds
Cross Validation
3.3.4 Case Study
For both experiments once the training process was completed. Each trained model was
fed a list of a software specifications that was acquired from an SRS document. The
specifications list contained 30 requirements in total. Table 11 shows examples taken from that
requirements list.
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To obtain a robust list that can be determined as a security requirement list of a said
system. First the list of 30 requirements were subjected to the preprocessing techniques
addressed earlier in Section 2.2.2 to transform it into a machine understandable form. Second, a
majority vote ensemble was adopted, where a requirement is added to the list if the three-trained
models (the SVM, the Naïve, and the Random Forest) label that requirement as security related.
Table 11: Examples from the Software Requirements List Used for The Case Study
Requirement Description
The system should support multilingual interface
The system should work even in an offline mode with the critical functionality
The search should fetch only the fields that need to be displayed to the user. Only when the user
clicks on a particular record to view its further details should a query be fired to fetch the additional
details for this particular record only
Database Indexes should be applied on the key columns used for searching
The system must support multiple types of communication services for remote access
The system should be built on a common User Access and Authentication Service to ensure SingleSign on for the end-user
The system should have capability to support public access to a subset of data and functionality

For the first experiment where the ensemble models were trained using the SecReq
dataset [59], the ensemble majority vote extracted only 3 requirements as security requirements.
Examining the ensemble extracted list in comparison to the original 30 requirements list. It was
clear that there was a significant loss in valuable requirements that clearly address security
threats or protect the system assets.

69

Table 12 shows the requirements that were extracted as security related from the first
experiment using the SecReq dataset [59].
For the second experiment where the ensemble models were trained using the enhanced
SecREP dataset, the ensemble majority vote extracted 17 requirements as security requirements.
Examining the ensemble extracted list in comparison to the original 30 requirements list. The list
does exhibit satisfactory results were all the extracted requirements do address a security issue in
terms of threats that need to be accounted for, system assets that needs protecting, or both.
Additionally, and in comparison, to the original 30 requirements list that was fed to the
ensemble, and using educated judgments the extracted list was comprehensive, and included all
the requirements that are indeed security related.
Table 13 shows the requirements that were extracted as security related from the second
experiment using the SecREP dataset.
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Table 12: Security Requirements List Extracted from First Experiment Using the SecReq
dataset
No.

Requirement Description
1: The system should be built on a common User Access and Authentication Service to
ensure Single-Sign on for the end-user.
2: The system should ensure secure transmission of data over the network and utilize SSL
and 2-way digital signatures.
3: The system should ensure high standards of security and access control through: a)
Prevent cross-site scripting b) Validate the incoming data / user request c) Encode the
incoming data / user request d) Prevent SQL Injection e) Utilize parameterized queries f)
Sanitize the user-inputs g) Validate the data both at the client and server h) Do not allow
hard delete and perform only soft tagging the row for deletion.

Table 13: Security Requirements List Extracted from Second Experiment Using the
SecREP dataset
No.

Requirement Description
1:

The system should work even in an offline mode with the critical functionality.

2:

The system should be designed to have satisfactory performance even in Police Stations
connected on low-bandwidth.

3:

The system should be built on a common User Access and Authentication Service to
ensure Single-Sign on for the end-user.

4:

The system should be developed to be deployed in a 3-tier datacenter architecture.
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5:

The system should be designed to have a n-tier architecture with the presentation logic
separated from the business logic that is again separated from the data-access logic.

6:

The system should be extensible to provide access to the interfaces through PDA’s and
mobile data terminals.

7:

The system should adopt standardized formats and common metadata elements.

8:

The system should be designed for access through browser-based systems and must
impose minimal requirements on the client device.

9:

The system should support SSL encrypted connections.

10: The system should support secure virtual private network connections.
11: The system should run on multiple browsers.
12: The system should support selective encryption of the stored data.
13: The system should ensure secure transmission of data over the network and utilize SSL
and 2-way digital signatures.
14: The system should ensure high standards of security and access control through: a)
Prevent cross-site scripting b) Validate the incoming data / user request c) Encode the
incoming data / user request d) Prevent SQL Injection e) Utilize parameterized queries
f) Sanitize the user-inputs g) Validate the data both at the client and server h) Do not
allow hard delete and perform only soft tagging the row for deletion.
15: Use of cache for storing frequent data.
16: The search should fetch only the fields that need to be displayed to the user. Only when
the user clicks on a particular record to view its further details should a query be fired to
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fetch the additional details for this particular record only.
17: Database Indexes should be applied on the key columns used for searching.

3.4 Discussion
To build part one of the SecREP pipeline where security related requirements can be
identified in an automated manner using a machine learning classification approach. First, and as
for all machine learning classification problems, a reliable dataset must be obtained. That is, a
dataset with sufficient, clear, balanced, and assorted samples, that can be used to achieve a
reliable prediction model. For the classification problem of identifying/extracting security
requirements from software requirements natural language artifacts. Two datasets were identified
that are publicly available and can serve this purpose, the SecReq dataset [59] and the NFR
dataset [60]. However, both datasets present a major challenge to the problem at hand. The issues
with the SecReq dataset [59] besides the intensive cleaning and fixing needed, the security
requirements samples are all expressed as non-functional requirements. Which would jeopardize
the completeness of extracting all security related requirements, since and as explained before,
security requirements intertwine with functional and non-functional requirements. Similar to the
SecReq dataset [59] the NFR dataset [60] also classifies the security requirements under the nonfunctional requirements. Additionally, the 11 categories of NFR can also be expressing a security
concern, and thus a considerable amount of these requirements can also be extracted as a security
requirement. To address these issues, different combinations of the available datasets were
conducted and put under the test. Each experiment/iteration helped improve the predictions of
the trained machine learning models. The resulting enhanced dataset “SecREP Dataset” is a
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combination of a cleaned version of the SecReq dataset [59] where all corrupted records were
rewritten, unclassified entries were labeled using educated judgments, and some large and
unclear requirements samples were split into two or more requirements and labeled accordingly.
This cleaned SecReq dataset [59] was then combined with some samples obtained from the NFR
dataset [60]. The sample selection criteria from the NFR dataset [60] were based on educated
judgments and experimentation. Finally, some samples were handpicked form SRS document to
further increase the diversity of the dataset.
To test the validity of the SecREP dataset, two experiments were conducted where in one
the machine learning models were trained using the SecRq dataset and using the SecREP in the
other. The training results, in terms of performance measures, shows similar results for both
variants of trained models. However, in the case study where each trained ensemble was fed a
list of requirements obtained form an SRS document. The trained model using the SecREP
dataset exhibited significantly improved results, and the ensemble majority vote was able to
extract 17 requirements that clearly address a security concern. Whereas the trained ensemble
model using the SecReq [59] dataset was able to extract only 3 requirements as security related.
These results highlight a notable loss of many requirements that should have been extracted
when the training was conducted using the SecReq dataset, and a notable increase in the
prediction performance using the SecREP enhanced dataset.
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CHAPTER 4: Security Requirements Prioritization
4.1 Prioritization Scheme
The objective of this thesis work is to 1) produce an automatic framework that extracts
security related requirements from a software system’s natural language artifacts, for example, a
Software Requirements Specification document (an SRS). And 2) to produce a prioritization
scheme where the extracted list of security requirements can be further refined into a prioritized
list. This section represents the prioritization scheme adopted to in second step of the SecREP
pipeline showed before in Section 1.4
Security requirements are complicated in nature. They express many aspects of a
software system and intertwine with all its properties, as well as with other types of
requirements. Examining security prioritization techniques introduced in literature that were also
summarized in Section 1.2.2. Many factors need to be identified in a security requirement to
assess it is quality and importance. These factors can vary depending on the nature and
functionality of the software system under question, the stakeholders need, and the system’s
operational environment. However, and in terms of security, a few constant factors can be used
to express the quality of a security requirement. These are, the assets a security requirement is
protecting, the threats it is attempting to mitigate, and the security properties its expressing (e.g.,
Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability…).
4.2 Proposed Prioritization Scheme
The prioritization scheme in this work, considers the quality and valuation of a security
requirements based on the three constant factors that were identified based on this work’s
literature study. These factors are assets, threats, and security attributes. With the aid of NLP

75

approaches that can be used to extract information form a software system’s requirements
artifacts, such factors can be more adequately identified in the context of a specified system.
To achieve the second part of SecREP framework, the extracted security requirements list
from the first part was subjected to a part of speech tagging method and a named entity
recognition method. To help recognize from that list, assets that need protecting, threats that
need to be addressed, and security properties the system must incorporate. Once these factors are
identified, a list of each factor can be established, where each security requirement can then be
tested against each list and weighed according to the number of assets, threats and security
properties being addressed in that specific security requirement. Additionally, to derive more
meaning to the security requirement and ensure that all threats are accounted for, each security
requirement was granted a STRIDE score. The STRIDE score was calculated based on text
similarity scoring approach. For each STRIDE threat a super-sentence that describes how the
system should prevent such threat was constructed. Using these super-sentences each security
requirement similarity score to each STRIDE sentence can thus be calculated. The security
requirement STRIDE score can then be expressed based on the number of STRIDE threats that
sentence is addressing. Finally, the priority score of each requirement can then be the sum of it is
corresponding STRIDE score, and the count score for each asset, threat, and security property
present in the security requirement.
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4.3 Case Sturdy and Prioritization Results
Continuing with the case study presented in the first part of the SecREP pipeline under
Section 3.3.4. The list of 17 security requirements was subjected to the preprocessing techniques
discussed in Section 3.2. To transform the text into a machine digestible form.
4.3.1 Constructing the Comparison Lists
Following the proposed prioritization pipeline. First, three lists were constructed: a list of
assets, a list of threats, and a list of security properties or attributes. The values in each of these
lists were chosen using generic values of known assets, threats, and security properties.
Additionally, the security requirements list was loaded into a spaCy natural language possessing
medium model, to utilize the models Word2vec vectorization method discussed in Section
2.2.3.2. In addition to the Word2vec method, the spaCy library offers several built in NLP
techniques.
To further enhance the comparison lists and make them specific to the context of the
given system. The spaCy Part-of-speech (POS) tagging method and the spaCy matcher were
used to extract, subjects, objects, nouns, subjects followed by verbs, and objects followed by a
verb. As expected, the resulting list from this extraction, contained a considerable number of
items. However, using educated judgments, the list was reduced to cover what was considered
either an asset, a threat, or a security property.
With this new insight into the system at hand, the complete comparison lists were
constructed, where each list contains general items, and items extracted from the specific nature
of the security requirement list.
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Table 14 shows the final comparison lists that were constructed as a result of processing
the security requirements list. While Figure 17 demonstrates the identification of these items in
the security requirements list.
Table 14: Comparison lists
Type

Items

Assets

Data, network, information, database, client, datacenter, design, user inputs,
record, architecture, access interface, client device, connection, business,
certificate, user.

Threats

access, spoof, alter, change, delete, modify, update, edit, tamper, repudiation,
denial, unauthorized, injection, deny, phishing, phish.

Security

Authentication, authenticity, authentic, authorization, confidential, available,

Properties

availability, confidentiality
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Figure 17: Identifying Assets, Threats, and Security Properties
4.3.2 Constructing the Super-Sentences
To add more robustness to the SecREP framework prioritization scheme. An approach
was adopted to identify if a security requirement protects against or is addressing a threat that
corresponds to the STRIDE threat modeling. The STRIDE model developed by Microsoft [30] is
a popular method used to identify security threats and groups them in six different categories:
Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, and Elevation of
privilege.
To incorporate the STRIDE model into the prioritization scheme. First, each security
requirement must be examined to see not only if a direct mention of a threat is present, but also if
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that requirement derived meaning correlates to the definitions of the STRIDE threats. To tackle
this task a text similarity technique was chosen. To use the idea of text similarity, first there must
be another sentence that can be compared to the text under question, to see if that text contains
the desired information. To do so, a list of super-sentences was constructed where each sentence
in the list corresponds to a behavior or quality, that would protect against the STRIDE threats.
With the establishment of the super-sentences, the problem becomes a simple similarity
problem to see how similar each security requirement is to that defined super-sentence. For
measuring a similarity score between each security requirement in the case study and the supersentences, the spaCy similarity function was used. The resulting score is represented as a
percentage of similar. To simplify the results, a security requirement was given a weight of 1 for
each STRIDE super-sentence with a similarity of 90% and above. Hence, the total STRIDE score
of a security requirement is the sum of all STRIDE similarity scores. Thus, in this case the
minimum STRIDE score a security requirement can have is 0 and the maximum is 6.
Table 15 describes the list of super-sentences.
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Table 15: STIDE Threat Model and The Super-Sentences
Threat type

Property

Super-Sentence Description

Spoofing

Authentication

Prevent illegal access and using another user's authentication
information, such as username and password

Tampering

Integrity

Prevent the malicious modification of data. Examples include
unauthorized changes made to persistent data, such as that held in a
database, and the alteration of data as it flows between two
computers over an open network, such as the Internet

Repudiation

Non-repudiation

Prevent users from performing an illegal action without other parties

services

having any way to prove otherwise, when a user performs an illegal
operation, the system should provide the ability to trace that
prohibited operations. The system should have the ability to counter
repudiation threats.

Information

Confidentiality

disclosure

Prevent the exposure of information to individuals who are not
supposed to have access to it. prevent the ability of users to read a
file that they were not granted access to, or the ability of an intruder
to read data in transit between two computers

Denial of

Availability

service

Prevent denial of service (DoS) to valid users. Prevent making a
Web server temporarily unavailable or unusable. A system should
be available and reliable

Elevation of
privilege

Authorization

Prevent an unprivileged user form gaining privileged access that is
sufficient to compromise or destroy the entire system. A system
should protect against situations in which an attacker has effectively
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penetrated all system defenses and become part of the trusted
system itself

4.3.3 The Prioritized List
Each security requirement in the list was compared with each item in the three
comparisons list that were constructed earlier. The weight of each security requirement is
increased by 1 if a matching item in these lists appears in the security requirement. Similarly,
after calculating the total STRIDE score for each sentence, the weight of each requirement was
incremented by its STRIDE score. Thus, the priority score for a given security requirement is the
sum of the count of all the assets, threats, and security properties it is addressing, in addition to
its STRIDE score that was defined earlier.
Figure 18 demonstrates the final extracted and prioritized security requirements list as a
result of the SecREP pipeline.

Figure 18: final extracted and prioritized security requirements list
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4.4 Discussion
To establish part two of the SecREP pipeline where extracted security related
requirements can be further analyzed and prioritized. First, a prioritization criterion was
established. The focus of this prioritization scheme was to incorporate NLP automated
techniques, such that minimal human interaction is needed. The proposed prioritization assesses
each requirement based on the number of assets, threats, and security properties that are directly
being addressed by the requirement. Additionally, and to add robustness to the prioritization, the
underlying meaning of a security requirement was also accounted for, using text similarity
approach to compare the security requirement against six super-sentences each corresponding to
the STRIDE threat model.
The case study showed how this prioritization scheme is conducted and how the priority
score was calculated. The final list of prioritized security requirements showcased the difference
in priority score between security requirements. Additionally, inspecting the list, the topmost
security requirements (with highest priority score) show a high level of correlation to critical
security aspects that must be addressed in every software system. What is worth mentioning
here, is that this prioritization scheme could be a reliable start to eliciting and prioritizing
security requirements. However, to ensure the completeness of a security requirement and its
priority, other factors and calculations must also be considered. For example, this proposed
prioritization scheme could be adopted to help identify assets, threats, security properties, and to
map the threats discussed by the security requirement to the STRIDE threat model. After doing
so, software engineers can use this information to further assess the security requirement in terms
of the risk value, the impact, the system’s vulnerabilities that can cause a threat to occur, the
underlying cost of implementing the security mechanisms...etc. Such values can improve the
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completeness and correctness to the security requirement and its priority. Additionally, further
valuation of the security requirement can help address those with competing priority scores, that
is two or more security requirement have the same priority weight. Additionally, techniques such
as, the AHP[49,57] the CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System), and the bug bars, can
help in calculating these values and solve the issue with competing security requirements.
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CHAPTER 5: Conclusion
This chapter provides the major conclusions and the planned future work based on the
results of this research effort.
5.1 Conclusion
This thesis has described the work and steps taken to achieve the Security Requirements
Extraction and Prioritization (SecREP) framework/pipeline. The SecREP pipeline presented in
this thesis consists of two major parts. Part one, demonstrates the efforts and experiments
conducted to establish a machine learning ensemble that extracts/identifies security requirements
from natural language software requirements artifacts. The majority vote ensemble was created
using three machine learning models, SVM, Naïve Bayes, and Random Forests. Two different
experiments were conducted to train and evaluation the machine learning models. In the first
experiment the machine was fed the SecReq dataset [59]. In the second experiment the machine
was fed the enhanced SecREP dataset that was conducted as a result of this work. Both trained
ensembles were applied to a case study. Where each ensemble model was fed a list of 30
requirements obtained form an SRS document. The results showed significantly improved
predictions using the majority vote of the ensemble trained on the SecREP dataset. The proposed
approach was able to extract 17 requirements as security requirements. In comparison, the
ensemble trained using the SecReq dataset [59] was able to extract only 3 requirements.
In the second part of the SecREP pipeline, a prioritization scheme was proposed to
evaluate the importance and analyze the extracted security requirements. The SecREP
prioritization process, valuates the priority of each security requirements in terms of the assets it
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is protecting, the threats it is addressing, and its security properties. In addition to its similarity to
a super-sentence that corresponds to the STRIDE threat model.
The proposed prioritization scheme was applied to the case study, to prioritize the
extracted list of 17 security requirements. Using NLP techniques such as, Part-of-speech (POS)
tagging and named entity recognition, three lists were conducted that represent the system assets,
threats, and security properties. Each security requirement was then compared against each item
in those lists, to extract the number of assets, threats, and security properties that are present in
the requirement. Finally using the Word2Vec and text similarity methods provided in spaCy
library [23], each security requirement was compared against 6 super-sentence that correspond to
the STRIDE threats definitions. In order to extract its STRIDE similarity score. The priority
score for each requirement was calculated that is, the sum of its assets, threats, and security
properties, and its STRIDE score. The final list of prioritized security requirements was
evaluated using expert judgment, where the list exhibited a variance in the priority scores and the
security requirements with highest priority scores do indeed show a high level of correlation to
critical security aspects that must be addressed in every software system.
5.2 Limitation of Study
Obtaining a dataset that can be utilized in a machine learning approach for classifying
security requirements was perhaps the most challenging aspect of this study. Two datasets that
can be used for such problem were publicly available. The SecReq dataset [59] and the NFR
dataset [60]. The concerns with these datasets are the low count of samples and the domain
specific examples. Additionally, and what is perhaps the biggest limitation is the fact that all
security labeled requirments are expressed as non-functional requirements. This classification
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under non-functional requirements can jeopardize the task at hand. That is to extract a
comprehensive list of security requirements for a software system form natural language
artifacts. In order for that list to be complete and correct, security requirements must be extracted
from functional and non-functional requirements alike. Due to the fact that security concerns and
the security aspects of a system relate directly to many of its functoriality, environment and
performance.
Despite the construction of the SecREP dataset in this work. Training a machine learning
model to extract security requirements from software systems natural language artifacts. Can be
significantly improved by further improving the dataset to contain more versatile and correct
samples that express the security requirements as functional and non-functional. Additionally,
increasing the size of the dataset will produce better learnt machine models, and can also allow
for training other machine learning models than the ones addressed in this study (SVM, Naïve
Bayes, and Random Forest). For example, models such as the CNN, RNN and deep learning that
require large datasets, can be used to obtain remarkable results.
In terms of this work validity, the SecREP framework/pipeline was tested on one case
study and its results evaluation was based on its performance with that example. Further testing
can help fortify the validity of the SeREP framework/pipeline and can help recognize weak
points that needs addressing.
Finally, and what is worth mentioning here, is that this prioritization scheme provided by
the SecREP is only a reliable start to eliciting and prioritizing security requirements. However, to
ensure the completeness of a security requirement and its priority, other factors and calculations
must also be considered. For example, the risk value, the impact, the system’s vulnerabilities that
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can cause a threat to occur, the underlying cost of implementing the security mechanisms...etc.
Such values can improve the completeness and correctness to the security requirement and its
priority. Additionally, the prioritization scheme proposed in this work does not address the
problem of security requirements with competing priority scores, that is two or more security
requirement have the same priority weight. However, techniques such as, the AHP [45,52] the
CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System), and the bug bars, can help in calculating these
missing values and solve the issue with competing security requirements.
5.3 Future Work
As a result of the work conducted in this thesis, several research opportunities,
unexplored areas, and enhancements openings can be addressed in future work.
x

Enhancing the SecREP Dataset: The SecREP dataset can be further enhanced, in
terms of size, completeness, correctness and diversity of the samples. A need is
still dire for a large in scale dataset of software requirements classified as either
security related as non-security related. That ensures to incorporate security
requirements samples that are expressed as functional security requirements and
non-functional security requirements.
Additionally, different combinations of the SecReq [59] dataset and the NFR
dataset [60] can still be tested to see if that would improve upon the SecREP
dataset.
Finally, there is an opportunity to use the SecREP extraction model, or similar
models, to help extract security requirements samples from software systems
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natural language artifacts, where these samples can be then added to the SecREP
list and used to retrain the SecREP model or to train different models.
x

Evaluating other Machine Learning models: Other machine learning models for
example, CNNs, RNNs, Decision tree, KNN algorithm, K-means…etc. Can still
be experimented with using the SecREP dataset, the SecReq [59] dataset and the
NFR dataset [60], or different combinations of them.

x

Additional Case Studies: The SecREP pipeline can be subjected to different case
studies for different domains. For example, to extract security requirements form
users reviews and feedback, or mobile applications reviews. Additionally, there is
a comparison study opportunity, where the SecREP framework validity and
performance can be tested against similar or related models.

x

Enhanced Prioritization: The prioritization scheme proposed by the SecREP
framework, has many areas of improvements. First the prioritization can be
further extended and automated to account for other important values regarding
security requirements, for example risk calculation, threat impact, likelihood of a
threat...etc. Second, a scheme can be added to the prioritization process to address
the issue with competing security requirements with similar priority scores. Third,
the scheme can be further automated to extract any human element, wherein the
SecREP pipeline, software engineers need to finalize and review the comparison
lists extracted by the process that correspond to their system assets, threats, and
security properties. Finally, the prioritization scheme can be further tested on
different case studies and can be compared and tested against other similar or
related approaches.
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